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Updating Your Fantasy Lineups and the Federal Law:
The Case for Federal Regulation of Daily Fantasy Sports

I.

INTRODUCTION
Jared Beisel’s Daily Fantasy Team was leading by a small margin in the closing minutes

of what had become an uncompetitive National Football League game—that is, in the real world.1
The San Francisco 49ers had time on their side, not to mention a seventeen point advantage over
a desperate Minnesota Vikings, with two minutes remaining in the final game of week one.2
Essentially, the game was over.3 In theory, no remaining performances could affect the outcome
of the game: the 49ers possessed the ball, the Vikings were out of time-outs, and “victory
formation”4 was inevitable.5 Put straightforwardly, most avid football fans would have lost interest
and, by this point, tuned in elsewhere. But for an interested fantasy participant, drastic implications
loomed upon whether the 49ers decided to kneel6 or run the ball in order to drain the clock and
win the game. Unfortunately for Beisel, the 49ers opted for the latter, sealing not only the week
one fate of the Vikings, but Beisel’s chances at winning an additional one million dollars.7
Ultimately, Carlos Hyde provided the necessary sum of fantasy points to the then second place
contestant to win the contest, edging Beisel out of first place.8

1

ESPN Front Row, DraftKings Millionaire Maker Runner-up Nets $1M, plus $1M for his ESPN Fantasy Leagues,
http://www.espnfrontrow.com/2015/09/draftkings-millionaire-maker-runnerup-nets-1m-plus-1m-for-his-espnfantasy-leagues/ (last accessed Nov. 4, 2015).
2
Id.
3
See id.
4
An event where a team’s quarterback kneels down with possession of the football in order to keep the game clock
running. By deploying this technique, a team seeks to preserve a victory by draining the game clock and depriving
the opponent of any possible chance to gain additional possession and possible points. See Sports Lingo: Definition
for Common Sports Slang & Jargon, Victory Formation, http://www.sportslingo.com/sports-glossary/v/victoryformation/ (last accessed Oct. 30, 2015).
5
See ESPN Front Row, supra note 1.
6
See Sports Lingo, supra note 4.
7
Id.
8
Beisel did not come out empty-handed entirely. As the second place participant in the DraftKings “Millionaire
Maker Contest,” Beisel was still rewarded a handsome sum of one million dollars. Had Beisel finished in first, his
earnings would have doubled. See ESPN Front Row, supra note 1.
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What exactly are the chances that, rather than solidify victory by conventionally “kneeling
the football” in a scenario that begs for a team to do so, instead, the 49ers seal their victory with a
Carlos Hyde run netting five redundant yards? Can an individual possibly have predicted this type
of event to occur and chalk it up having a skill or being savvy to the game? This is precisely the
scenario that repeats itself week in and week out for millions of Daily Fantasy Sports (“DFS”)
participants across the nation.
Through persistent advertising campaigns, Nigel Eccles and Jason Robins, Chief Executive
Officers of the two leading DFS websites, FanDuel and DraftKings respectively, have
revolutionized traditional fantasy sports—the social competition that allows friends and family to
test one another’s sports knowledge by assigning point values to each professional or collegiate
athlete’s earned statistic, tallying the aggregate amount of points that one fantasy participant’s
assembled roster earns, and rewarding the individual fantasy participant with the most points come
season’s end. DFS are the latest phenomenon that has invaded every consumer’s living room with
commercial advertisements in between their favorite sitcoms and the 11 o’clock news. “Scott H.,”
the face of the now infamous FanDuel television advertisement, proclaims the universal ease of
winning up to two million in cash prizes by depositing as little as thirty five dollars.9

DFS’s

affordability, coupled with allowing participants to draft new teams on a far more frequent basis
(daily) than season-long traditional fantasy sports, has transformed fantasy sports into a growing
commercial enterprise.10

FanDuel’s greatest expense is advertising, having spent roughly twenty million dollars in the month of August
2015 for their advertisement to run 7,500 times. DraftKings is even more committed to advertising, spending
roughly eighty-one million dollars for their advertisements to air 22,000 times in the same time period. Steven
Perlberg, Are DraftKings and FanDuel Bombarding Fans With Too Many Ads?, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Sep.
16, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cmo/2015/09/16/are-draftkings-and-fanduel-bombarding-fans-with-toomany-ads/.
10
See Drew Casey, DraftKings, FanDuel Make Millions, and Give Them Away, as Fantasy Revs Up, CNBC (Sep.
20, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/09/20/draftkings-fanduel-make-millions-and-give-them-away-as-fantasyrevs-up.html; see also Chris Grove, Here’s How The One Day Fantasy Sports Industry Hits $2.5bn By 2020, LEGAL
9
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But how has fantasy sports become such a ubiquitous and inescapable pillar of American
sports? The answer is that DFS mesh together and makes available to the consumer two tantalizing
concepts: money and sports—a combination that is taboo in America.11 But the answer begs the
question: does DFS amount to unlawful sports gambling? Certainly, wherever money is to be
earned, laws are to be established; however, the latter has not yet occurred, at least in workable
way. The residual debate leaves lobbyists calling for regulation in the unchartered legal territory
of DFS. Different legal challenges to the two leading DFS online platforms, FanDuel and
DraftKings, are now exploding into mainstream media.
Two competing notions prevail in the debate over DFS legality. On one hand, skill is a
prerequisite to win in DFS. This theory presumes that a majority of DFS winners are sufficiently
skilled, and when unskilled players win, luck or chance is not a predominant factor. On the other
hand, assembling a fantasy roster that out-performs other participants’ rosters is in large part a
result of chance. Nonetheless, DFS are entertaining, appealing, and above all else, extremely
lucrative.12

Popular demand, massive sponsorship, and the deeply rooted tradition and

compatibility of fantasy sports and real sports indicates that DFS are here to stay. While it may be
argued against, it cannot be denied that DFS have become, albeit in exceptionally rapid fashion, a
meaningful part of American culture.
This note seeks to introduce the various concerns and conflicts between state gaming laws
arising in conjunction with the exponential growth of DFS. In doing so, it will become apparent
that uniform regulation at the Federal level is necessary to corral this quasi-gambling, skill-based
phenomenon. Moreover, the latest proposed New Jersey and California regulations should be a

SPORTS REPORT (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/170/revenue-projections-for-daily-fantasysports-sites/.
11
See discussion infra Part II.b.
12
See supra note 10.
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model for federal amendment. Part II discusses the history and background of Fantasy Sports with
emphasis on its underlying purpose and evolution. Parts III, IV, and V explain the tension brewing
between federal law enactments and the different dynamics that have resulted at the state law level
using state case studies with emphasis on New Jersey. However, rather than absolutely deny
access to DFS, the multi-variable game allows issues to be addressed through regulation. Part VI
offers an analysis using the Predominant Purpose Test that argues that while DFS are a game that
is predominantly based on skill, residual dangers and harms linger given DFS’s resemblance to
gambling. Part VII provides resolution that will, once and for all, establish a broad enough
standard allowing DFS to operate while maintaining state sovereignty in accordance with each
State’s constituency. Finally, Part VIII concludes this note.
II.

FANTASY SPORTS FIASCO: THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DAILY FANTASY SPORTS AND ITS
COUNTERPARTS

For those less athletically inclined individuals excluded from playing on an organized
sports team, fantasy sports has served to fill that void. Dan Okrent and Lee Eisenberg, two
Manhattan-based journalists, created what would become contemporary fantasy sports, capable of
being played by people of all shapes, sizes, and athletic ability.13 The origin of fantasy sports,
which is crucial to the pro-fantasy argument in contemporary legal debate, ironically came to
Okrent in a dream.14 What started as a mere fascination and obsession over box scores, became a
platform for the fantasy framework—or at the time, “Rotisserie Baseball.”15
a. THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF FANTASY SPORTS: ROTISSERIE BASEBALL

13

30 for 30: Silly Little Game (ESPN television broadcast Apr. 20, 2010).
Id.
15
The fantasy founding fathers dubbed their game Rotisserie Baseball, named after the site where the first
agreement to and in-depth discussion of the game’s rules took place: the La Rotisserie Française in New York City.
Id.
14
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Late in 1979, a clear set of rules emerged and was codified in the Official Constitution of
Rotisserie League Baseball.16 The concept of the game was centered on meticulously collecting
baseball statistics in order to challenge one another’s baseball knowledge.17 Each participant
assembled an imaginary baseball team consisting of players from either Major League Baseball’s
American or National Leagues.18 The owners of the ten imaginary teams acquired their players
through an “auction draft.”19 Statistics were arranged categorically, in order to determine who had
the best team.20 The course of the game ran concurrent with the MLB season and the team with
the best stats at the end of the season won the “Wiggy Cup” and became subject to the Yoo-Hoo
ceremony.21

16

The Rotisserie League Constitution parodied the United States Constitution with a preamble that stated:
We, the People of the Rotisserie League, in order to spin a more perfect Game, drive Justice home,
kiss domestic Tranquility good-bye, promote the general Welfare in Tidewater – where it’s been
tearing us the International League – and secure the Blessings of Puberty to ourselves and those
we’ve left on Base, do ordain and establish the Constitution for Rotisserie League Baseball, and also
finish this run-on sentence.

GLEN WAGGONER & ROBERT SKLAR, ROTISSERIE LEAGUE BASEBALL—THE OFFICIAL RULEBOOK AND COMPLETE
GUIDE TO PLAYER VALUES 10–30 (Bill Gray et al., Bantam Books 1989) (available at http://www.c-rl.org/rules/origcon.htm).
17
See 30 for 30: Silly Little Game, supra note 13.
18
Because statistic gathering was done manually—i.e., before the internet tallied up individual statistics in an
convenient format—the Rotisserie League required that teams be composed entirely of either AL or NL players for
simplification. See 30 for 30: Silly Little Game, supra note 13 (noting the tedious efforts in collecting statistics
manually); see also WAGGONER, supra note 16 (suggesting that NL and AL players should be kept separate because
mixing the two leagues is “silly and unrealistic”). Rosters were composed according to positions: “five outfielders,
two catchers, one second baseman, one shortstop, one middle infielder (either second baseman or shortstop), one
first baseman, one third baseman, one corner man (either first baseman or third baseman), one utility player (who
may play any non-pitching position), and nine pitchers.” WAGGONER, supra note 16.
19
The auction draft format was the means chosen to acquire 23 players through purchase not to exceed $260. The
bid for a player subject to draft started at $1. Each team owner would have an opportunity to bid on the player
through $1 increment bids. The owner with the highest bid earned the player at that price. See WAGGONER, supra
note 16.
20
The criteria used to determine the best team and standings included: (1) batting average, (2) home runs, (3) runs
batted in, (4) stolen bases, (5) earned run average, (6) wins, (7) saves, and (8) the composite ratio of bases acquired
on balls plus hits divided by innings pitched. Id. To count and award points, Okrent went line-by-line in the box
scores and collected each player’s individual statistics with a ledger sheet, a calculator, a pen and paper at his
exposal. See 30 for 30: Silly Little Game, supra note 13.
21
The “Wiggy Cup” was passed along to the winner at the end of each season. The winning owner’s team name
was inscribed on the trophy. The Yoo-Hoo ceremony was the Rotisserie League’s equivalent to the traditional
“champagne baths” that major league teams engaged in to celebrate playoff victories. The Rotisserie League’s
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According to Okrent, each participant studied statistics for endless hours in order to prove
who the most knowledgeable baseball fan was.22 Eisenberg proclaimed that the primary objective
of the game was to “use baseball insight, combined with poker skills, to outfox opponents around
the draft table” and to “try to improve [the owners’] teams through furious trading.”23 In addition,
owners actively sought “sleeper picks” to substantiate their superior knowledge over other owners.
For instance, Neil Allen, at the beginning of the 1980 season, was not the designated Mets closer;
however, he usurped the Mets’ original closer by season’s end and helped propel the Getherswag
Goners—the Rotisserie team that owned him—to win the first ever Rotisserie League
Championship.24
Rotisserie Baseball generated massive interest due to the connections and affiliations that
the Rotisserie founders’ had with various media outlets.25 The founders attempted to exploit this
growing interest by trademarking Rotisserie Baseball, selling merchandise, and producing
marketing videos.26 However, the game they had invented had unequivocally outgrown them as
participants grew into the millions.27 The birth of the internet provided the Rotisserie Baseball

tradition consisted of the winning team being doused with chocolate milk in the presence of the other losing teams.
Of course, the auction draft fees collected by the league’s treasurer was divvied up based on final standings: first
place received half of the pool; second place received 25 percent; third place received 15 percent; and fourth place
received 10 percent. WAGGONER, supra note 16.
22
See 30 for 30: Silly Little Game, supra note 13.
23
Lee Eisenberg, Views of Sport; The Awful Truth About Rotisserie League Baseball, NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 8,
1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/04/08/sports/views-of-sport-the-awful-truth-about-rotisserie-leaguebaseball.html (noting that Rotisserie baseball eradicated the boundaries of loyalty when real sports and imaginary
sports intersected, pitting the owned players on a Rotisserie team against real life favorite teams). Trading players
between owners became such a significant strategic aspect of the game that in order to acquire Bill Buckner, the
Chicago Cubs first baseman, Eisenberg offered his trade partner a brand new dress shirt, which was accepted. See 30
for 30: Silly Little Game, supra note 13.
24
Allen was purchased for two dollars and subsequently outperformed his bargain price by pitching approximately
thirty saves by the end of the season. See 30 for 30: Silly Little Game, supra note 13.
25
Eisenberg estimated that approximately half of a million people play the game; notably, Governor Mario M.
Cuomo, Bryant Gumbel, and Jim Kaat owned Rotisserie teams. See Eisenberg, supra note 23.
26
See 30 for 30: Silly Little Game, supra note 13.
27
See id.
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market with a platform that facilitated mass participation.28 The season-long game was adapted
and offered for free by major sports conglomerates, such as ESPN and Yahoo! Sports.29
Furthermore, these companies expanded the fantasy concept to other sports, such as football and
basketball.30

Cease and desist letters sent by the founders to program developers proved

inefficient; instead, the name was simply changed to “Fantasy Sports” and rules could be adjusted
per each individual league’s liking.31 On average, the approximate thirty million fantasy users
spend over ten hours a week researching about what is now considered traditional fantasy sports.32
b. TWEAKING TRADITION: THE DAILY FANTASY SPORTS PHENOMENON—WHAT IT IS
AND HOW IT WORKS
Daily fantasy has commercialized fantasy sports by utilizing the internet to connect fans
worldwide. DFS offer its participants an accelerated version of traditional fantasy sports with
contests on a per day basis played primarily among large groups of strangers.33 Furthermore, the
concept of a draft is removed and replaced with a salary cap, similar to traditional Rotisserie
Leagues, except every player in the league is available in every contest.34 Each player is “priced”
commensurate with their ability.35 DFS websites offer various contests and tournaments with
single entry fees ranging from $0.25, for contests with lower payouts and more contestants, to as
high as $5,300, for contests with higher payouts and less contestants.36

28

See id.
See id.
30
See id.
31
See id.
32
See 30 for 30: Silly Little Game, supra note 13.
33
Adam Kilgore, Daily Fantasy Sports Web Sites Find Riches in Internet Gaming Law Loophole, THE WASHINGTON
POST (Mar. 27, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/daily-fantasy-sports-web-sites-find-riches-ininternet-gaming-law-loophole/2015/03/27/92988444-d172-11e4-a62f-ee745911a4ff_story.html.
34
See id.
35
For instance, a player with a higher likelihood of scoring more fantasy points, such as Aaron Rodgers, will cost
more than a player with a lower likelihood of scoring fantasy points, such as Robert Griffin III. Id.
36
Drew Harwell, The Rise of Daily Fantasy Sports, Online Betting’s Newest Empire, THE WASHINGTON POST (July
28, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/07/28/how-daily-fantasy-sites-became-pro-sportsnewest-addiction-machine/. Although there is typically a correlation in how payout and the maximum entries
allowed relate to each other, contest structures can vary.
29
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The origins of DFS trace back to 2007, where HubDub—a web-based prediction market in
which users may wager on politics, sports, entertainment, technology, and other categories37—
introduced its version of fantasy sports with a game called FanDuel.38 HubDub received its first
Series A funding led by Pentech Ventures and Scottish Co-Investment Fund.39

From this

capitalization, HubDub wisely chose to focus its attention on Nigel Eccles’ FanDuel.40 As interest
in FanDuel grew, investors continued to pour funding into the company and in 2013, FanDuel
secured another major investor in Comcast Ventures.41 Just this past year, FanDuel raised $275
million in additional financing by drawing big-name investors such as Google Capital and Time
Warner.42 As a self-funding business driven primarily by entry fees, FanDuel raised roughly $300
million in entry fees this past year alone.43 By 2020, growth projections suggest that DFS could
net a whopping $2 billion in total annual revenue.44
Perhaps the most intriguing advocates of DFS involve partnership ventures between DFS
providers and the four major American sports leagues; the very leagues that initiated a lawsuit
opposing sports betting in the state of New Jersey.45 The most logical explanation for these

37

Hubdub Ltd., BLOOMBERG BUSINESS, http://www.bloomberg.com/profiles/companies/0088055Z:LN-hubdub-ltd.
Mike Butcher, HubDub Closes News Site to Focus on Fantasy Sports Spinoff FanDuel, TECH CRUNCH (Apr. 14,
2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/04/14/hubdub-closes-news-site-to-focus-on-fantasy-sports-spinoff-fanduel/.
39
Mike Butcher, HubDub’s News 'Game' Secures it a $1.2m Series A Funding, TECH CRUNCH (Jan. 14, 2009),
http://techcrunch.com/2009/01/14/hubdubs-news-game-secures-it-a-12m-series-a/.
40
See Butcher, supra note 38; see also Butcher, supra note 39.
41
For its $11 million investment, Comcast Ventures received an equity interest in FanDuel and assigned its partner
Andrew Cleland to FanDuel’s board of directors. Darren Heitner, Fantasy Sports Service, FanDuel, Secures $11
Million Investment; Includes Money from Comcast Ventures, FORBES (Jan. 30, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/2013/01/30/fantasy-sports-service-fanduel-secures-11-millioninvestment-includes-money-from-comcast-ventures/.
42
Michael J. de la Merced, FanDuel to Announce that it has Raised $275 Million More, NEW YORK TIMES (Jul. 14,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/14/business/dealbook/fanduel-to-announce-it-has-raised-275-millionmore.html?_r=0.
43
FanDuel reserves only about 10 percent of this intake for profit, while the rest is given away as contestant prizes.
See Casey, supra note 10.
44
See Grove, supra note 10.
45
See NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. N.J. 2013) (writ of certiorari denied) (affirming NCAA v.
Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551 (D.N.J. 2013)) (herein after “Christie I”).
38
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partnerships is that they allow the leagues to exploit the increase in popularity resulting from the
way fantasy has changed how fans follow the sport.46 FanDuel first reached a deal with the MLB
and shortly after the NBA followed, in which both organizations received a partial stake in the
company.47 Essentially, these major sports leagues have a stake in the entry fee earnings in
exchange for sponsorship and advertisement rights.48

The relationship the leagues have

established with DFS appears hypocritical given their “integrity” argument made against sports
betting.49 If the leagues’ argument that sports betting may influence the “fixing” of professional
sports games, then the fact that these leagues sponsor DFS contests is troubling. However, viewed
from a different lens, their financial involvement insinuates that the very leagues, so passionately
devoted to protecting the integrity of sports, stand squarely in support of DFS. Their support
suggests that DFS pose no threat, given its multitude of variables, of influencing contests the same
way sports betting does.50
To date, virtually all major American professional sports teams have entered into
sponsorship agreements with either DraftKings or FanDuel magnifying the footprints DFS
continues to leave behind in the American sports industry.51 While the duopoly of FanDuel and
DraftKings face little competition in the fantasy market, Yahoo! has recently launched its version

46

Local markets no longer consist of local teams only. Fantasy has evolved the way fans view the sport; it has
created a fan interest in out-of-town teams and low standing teams, increasing those games’ value. DirecTV
recently renewed its contract for the exclusive right to broadcast out-of-town games for $1.5 billion per year—a
$500 million increase from the previous year. Chris Isidore, How Fantasy Sports Changed the NFL, CNN MONEY
(Sept. 11 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/09/11/news/companies/fantasy-football/.
47
See Kilgore, supra note 33.
48
Id.
49
See discussion infra Section III.a.
50
Id.
51
Dustin Gouker, DFS Partnership/Sponsorship Tracker, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT,
http://www.legalsportsreport.com/dfs-sponsorship-tracker/.
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of DFS and could instantly challenge FanDuel and DraftKings as the leading DFS provider, just
as it did to Rotisserie Baseball.52
III.

FEDERAL LAWS PROHIBITING SPORTS WAGERING AND ILLEGAL GAMBLING
a. PROTECTING INTEGRITY: PROFESSIONAL SPORTS’ POLICY AND PERSPECTIVE
Sports betting has always carried a negative connotation in America. In 1989, Pete Rose

was made permanently ineligible from playing Major League Baseball after violating Major
League Baseball’s Rule 21(d).53 His lifetime ban was recently upheld in April 2015, showing
MLB’s commitment to the rule.54 The rule prohibits those players, umpires, league officials, or
employees with a duty to perform from betting on a Major League Baseball game.55 However,
sports betting concerns trace back further to a 1919 scandal in which eight Chicago White Sox
players were banned from baseball for fixing that year’s World Series.56 This event led to the
creation of the Office of the Commissioner of Baseball, and the insertion of anti-sports gambling
measures for the professional affiliates of the league in its bylaws.57 Similar measures followed
in the other major sports as well.58

52

Chris Grove, Yahoo Enters Daily Fantasy Sports Market: Impacts And Analysis, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (July 8,
2015), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/2152/yahoo-enters-daily-fantasy-sports-market/.
53
The Pete Rose Case; The 2 Rules in the Rose Case, NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 25, 1989),
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/08/25/sports/the-pete-rose-case-the-2-rules-in-the-rose-case.html.
54
Bob Nightengale, Pete Rose's Reinstatement Bid Denied by MLB Commissioner Rob Manfred, USA TODAY (Dec.
14, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/2015/12/14/baseball-commissioner-rob-manfred-not-reinstatepete-rose-cincinnati-reds/77290922/.
55
The Pete Rose Case, supra note 53.
56
PAULA M. ANDERSON ET AL., SPORTS BETTING: LAW AND POLICY 936 (T.M.C. Asser Press 2012).
57
Id. at 938.
58
See, e.g., Constitution and By-laws of the National Basketball Association (May 29, 2012) (herein after “NBA
Constitution”). The language in the NBA Constitution reflects the common abhorrence to sports wagers among
professional sport leagues:
Any Player who, directly or indirectly, wagers money or anything of value on the outcome of any
game played by a Team in the league operated by the Association shall, on being charged with such
wagering, be given an opportunity to answer such charges after due notice, and the decision of the
Commissioner shall be final, binding and conclusive and unappealable [sic]. The penalty for such
offense shall be within the absolute and sole discretion of the Commissioner and may include a fine,
suspension, expulsion and/or perpetual disqualification from further association with the
Association or any of its Members.
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It is self-evident why professional sports league affiliates who have a substantial influence
on a contest’s outcome are prohibited from betting on them. While lobbying for Congressional
response to such concerns, former commissioners David Stern and Paul Tagliabue of the NBA and
NFL respectively, testified that gambling poses a threat to the integrity of the game and sets a
standard that may corrupt America’s youth.59 An entirely different issue arises as to whether
players or, as referred to by the NBA Constitution, “persons” may participate in fantasy sports.60
The lack of clarity as to whether professional sports affiliates can engage in fantasy sports contests
as the equivalent to gambling is exemplified in the differing policies of each major professional
sport imposes.
Major League Baseball has taken a stance through its Collective Bargaining Agreement
with its players’ union that disallows players’ participation in fantasy sports that involve the
transfer of money or other prizes.61 The MLB is determined to create a barrier that protects the
sport’s integrity from anything that would entice game-fixing—unless, of course, it involves
profiting through its DFS endorsement deals.62 The National Basketball Association and the

Article 35A(g)(i) prohibits any person other than players—defined as Members, Owners, Officers,
Managers, Coaches, Referees, employees, or their agents or representatives—from “directly or indirectly
wager[ing] money or anything of value on the outcome of any game played by a [t]eam in the league
operated by the Association.” An example of this rule’s implementation comes at the expense of ex-NBA
25-year veteran official, Tim Donaghy. See Robert G. Anderson & Daniel Ruetenik, Ex-NBA Ref Tim
Donaghy's Personal Foul 60 Minutes: Disgraced Ref Talks About Betting Scandal, The Mob, And How He
Got Caught, CBS NEWS (Dec. 3, 2009) http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ex-nba-ref-tim-donaghys-personalfoul/2/. Donaghy used NBA inside information to win between seventy and eighty percent of his wagers
on NBA games that he officiated. Id. As a result, Donaghy was removed as an NBA official and served
eleven months in federal prison for passing gambling tips across state lines. Id.
59
See ANDERSON ET AL. supra note 56, at 938.
60
See NBA Constitution supra note 58.
61
Mason Levinson, Daily Fantasy Sports Growth Pushes Leagues to Regulate Players, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS
(Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-01/daily-fantasy-sports-growth-pushes-leaguesto-regulate-players.
62
MLB spokesman Pat Courtney offers reconciliation in that the league seeks to make fantasy distinct from
“competition on the field and for on-field personnel to have no other outside influences on them with regard to the
game.” Thus, according to MLB spokesman Greg Bouris, “[t]he [collective bargaining agreement] doesn’t limit
players’ ability to sign sponsorship deals or other business transactions with fantasy sites.” See id.
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National Hockey League likewise bar players from participating in fantasy contests that require
entry fees and awards prizes.63 Meanwhile, all three establishments endorse one of the two leading
DFS platforms, which they refuse to characterize as illegal gambling.64 While simultaneously
prohibiting players from participating in DFS seem hypocritical, it reflects the uncertainty
surrounding DFS. Only the National Football League allows player participation in fantasy
leagues.65 Fantasy Football has had its presence felt by NFL players, especially those who actually
participate in fantasy.66 However, while fantasy is certainly on the minds of some players, it only
seems to affect a player’s popularity and is not likely to influence their performance more than any
other non-fantasy factors.67 This is because of the NFL’s policy limits a player to collecting no
more than $250 worth of prizes.68 Nonetheless, the regulation of gambling on professional sports
culminated in the passage of the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992
(“PASPA”).69
b. PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS PROTECTION ACT OF 1992
The Enactment of PASPA has faced various constitutional challenges both judicially and
publically.70 PASPA makes it unlawful for (i) a governmental entity or a person pursuant to the

63

Id.
Id.
65
According to NFL policy, fantasy games are not considered gambling, thus players may participate only when no
wager is placed on the outcome of any football game. Furthermore, any NFL affiliate cannot accept more than $250
in prizes or awards. See Roger Goodell, NFL COMPLIANCE PLAN 14 (July 2014).
66
According to Greg Jennings of the Green Bay Packers, fans have expressed a heightened enthusiasm towards
players because of their fantasy prowess. However, when players underperform, fans have expressed disdain, which
has motivated players to perform better to spite obsessed fantasy fans. Jennings notes that fantasy also gets in the
minds of players who own fantasy teams. It gets difficult when “[players] compet[e] against a guy” on their fantasy
team, and therefore “want[s] that guy to be successful” at the same time. Jeff Bercovivi, Greg Jennings Reveals
What NFL Players Really Think of Fantasy Football, FORBES (Mar. 10, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffbercovici/2012/03/10/greg-jennings-reveals-what-nfl-players-really-think-offantasy-football/#6711c5e84fe2.
67
See id.
68
See id.; see also Goodell, supra note 65.
69
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 3701 (1992).
70
See Interactive Media Entm't & Gaming Ass'n v. Holder, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23383 (D.N.J. Mar. 7, 2011)
(holding that Plaintiffs have no standing to challenge the constitutionality of PASPA because the New Jersey
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law of a governmental entity to (ii) “sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by
law or compact” (iii) “a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme” (iv)
based, “directly or indirectly on one or more competitive games in which amateur or professional
athletes participate,” or (v) on “one or more performances of such athletes in such games.”71 Put
simply, the government cannot pass a law that allows betting on professional sports.
PASPA’s enactment, however, included a caveat that grandfathered in certain states that
were previously permitted to enact such sports betting laws.72 New Jersey was the potential
beneficiary of one particular provisionary exception.73 Section 3704 of PASPA provides that if a
betting, gambling, or wagering scheme was already in operation via State Constitution in the ten
year window prior to PASPA’s effective date, and the scheme be authorized within one year after
the effective date of the legislation, then the prohibitory section shall not apply. 74 Consequently,
five states had been previously taking bets and thus subject to the “grandfather clause”—Nevada,
Oregon, Delaware, Montana, and New Jersey.75 New Jersey, however, failed to subsequently
authorize its sports wagering scheme until its latest Constitutional amendment, and thus failed to
trigger the exception.
c. UNLAWFUL INTERNET GAMING ENFORCEMENT ACT
The Unlawful Internet Gaming Enforcement Act of 2006 (“UIGEA”) arguably takes
absolutely no stance on whether daily fantasy is legal. It defines unlawful internet gambling as (a)

Constitution had not yet been amended to allow sports betting and thus had not met the (i) injury in fact, and (ii)
redressability factors required by Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, (1992)); NCAA v. Governor of N.J.,
799 F.3d 259, (3d Cir. N.J. 2015) (holding that the New Jersey Sports Wagering Act violated PASPA and PASPA is
not an unconstitutional violation of the anti-commandeering doctrine) (rehearing en banc granted in NCAA v.
Rebuck, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 17839 (3d Cir. N.J. Oct. 14, 2015)).
71
28 U.S.C. § 3702 (1992).
72
28 U.S.C. § 3704 (1992); see also ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 56, at 863–64.
73
See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 56, at 863–64.
74
Id.
75
Joshua Brustein, New Jersey’s New Plan for Sports Gambling, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (June 23, 2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-06-23/new-jerseys-new-plan-for-sports-gambling.
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“placing, receiving, or otherwise knowingly transmitting” (b) a bet or wager (c) by means of the
internet (even in part) (d) in which “the bet or wager is unlawful under State or Federal law” (e)
“where the bet or wager is made.”76 The UIGEA applies to both the person placing the bet (i.e.,
the consumer or everyday sports fan) and the recipient of the bet.77

Moreover, the Act

encompasses those facilitating the bets, such as the gambling hubs and ports of the nation—such
as Las Vegas, Nevada and Atlantic City, New Jersey (i.e., the states in which these hubs reside).78
In passing UIGEA, Congress recognized that “traditional law enforcement mechanisms are
inadequate” for enforcing gambling prohibitions over the internet.79 Moreover, UIEGA regulates
activities that occur in interstate commerce; thus, intrastate activities are subject to individual state
regulation.80
The UIGEA’s text enumerates the activities excluded from the purview of an unlawful
wager.81 A particular provision within UIEGA has given DFS its springboard for the substantial
growth it has enjoyed.82 The most prevalent portion of the act explicitly excludes fantasy sports
from this prohibitory category, but neglects to mention daily fantasy.83
To qualify for exclusion as a fantasy sport contest, the UIGEA requires that (a) “prizes
and awards be predetermined and made known to participants,” (b) awards are not to be based on
the number of participants or amount of entry fees paid, (c) winning outcomes are “based on the
relative skill and knowledge of participants determined by accumulated statistics of multiple
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Unlawful Internet Gaming Enforcement Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5362(10)(A) (2015).
Id.
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31 U.S.C. § 5362 (10)(B).
79
See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 56, at 876.
80
Id. at 877.
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See 31 U.S.C. § 5362(1)(E)(9) (2015).
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Id.
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Id.
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athletes,” and (d) “no winning outcome be based on the score, point spread, or performance by any
single team or single athlete’s performance.”84
Both FanDuel and DraftKings exploit UIGEA’s missing “daily” language by astutely
catering their DFS platforms to UIEGA’s fantasy exclusion. For instance, a participant that
attempts to submit a fantasy line-up consisting of players all from the same real-life sports team
will be denied entry into any contest.85 Furthermore, each contest offers a link that provides its
payout structure, predetermined and available to every participant.86 However, DFS have managed
to evade the UIGEA’s provision that prohibits awarding prizes based on entrants or entry fees.
The amount of entrants and entry fees varies for each contest. There is an inevitable
correlation between the payout to winning participants and the total amount of entry fees (which
depends on the amount of participants or the cost of entry).87

Yet because prizes are

predetermined, it is difficult to violate this provision given its subjective nature (i.e., DraftKings
can simply argue that a payout scheme was structured based on a predetermined algorithm as
opposed to the final amount of contestants or entry fees; the predetermination of awards and prizes
bolsters this argument). Entry fees and the number of contestants allows DraftKings and FanDuel
to guarantee widely distributed prizes. As long as payout and entries are predetermined, the loose
and contradictory language of the law lets DFS sites maneuver around this provision.

84

Id.
The pool of players to choose from can be limited to those participating in as little as two sports contests (i.e., the
players on four separate sports teams); however, even for these particular DFS contests, DFS servers sufficiently
disallow participants to choose all players from one contest or one team. See, e.g., DraftKings, Daily Fantasy
Baseball League Rules, https://www.draftkings.com/help/mlb (last visited Jan. 11, 2016).
86
DraftKings, Terms of Use, https://www.draftkings.com/help/terms (last visited Jan. 11, 2016).
87
Typically, contests with either higher entry fees or more contestants will payout more prizes to either a greater
number of people or greater cash prizes to the highest placed participants. Nonetheless, unlike a state lottery which
has a growing pot dependent on the amount of ticket purchased, a DFS contest is predetermined and will not change.
See DraftKings, https://www.draftkings.com/lobby#/featured (last visited Jan. 11, 2016).
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IV.

ELEMENTS OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING: COMMON LAW
The three elements constituting illegal gambling are (1) consideration, (2) chance, and (3)

prize.88 Consideration must be present to categorize a game as illegal gambling. 89 Chance, in a
majority of jurisdictions, must predominate the game in order to categorize an activity as illegal
gambling.90 There are three tests of chance that courts look to in determining whether the chance
factor is satisfied: (1) the predominant purpose test, (2) the material element test, and (3) the
gambling instinct test.91 A majority of jurisdictions apply the predominant purpose test.92
a. MINORITY TESTS: THE MATERIAL ELEMENTS TEST & THE GAMBLING INSTINCT
TESTS
Courts in at least seven jurisdictions, including New York and New Jersey, utilize the
Material Element test.93 In practice, this test is problematic because the lack of a uniform definition
of “material” injects subjectivity into a judge’s ability to determine whether a particular game
passes muster.94

For instance, a material element could mean that chance is entirely incidental

or insignificant (i.e., not material) to the game’s outcome, yet a court may still decide it is illegal
gambling.95 Moreover, from a practical perspective, there is an element of chance in every
competition or contest imaginable. In effect, these tests allow courts to arbitrarily decide whether
a game is unlawful, as the reasoning suggests in United States v. Gotti. 96 There, the defendant

88

See Commonwealth v. Two Elec. Poker Game Machs., 502 Pa. 186 (1983) Harris v. Econ. Opportunity Comm'n,
Inc., 171 A.D.2d 223, 227 (App. Div. 1991).
89
Id. at 228 (holding that the purchase of five $2 raffle tickets was not a donation to a charitable cause but instead
amounted to the “purchase of chances, for valuable consideration, to participate in a contest which constituted an
illegal lottery.”).
90
Id.
91
Erica Okerberg, What's in a Game? A Test Under Which We May Call a "VGT" a Gambling Game is Not So
Sweet: Why Courts Should Not Apply the Material Element Test to VGTS, 5 UNLV GAMING L.J. 27.
92
See, e.g., Two Elec., 502 Pa. at 186 (rejecting a standard making a game illegal if the outcome is based entirely on
chance and instead adopting the predominant purpose test).
93
See Okerberg supra note 91, at 28 n.3.
94
See id. at 28–29.
95
Id.
96
United States v. Gotti, 459 F.3d 296, 342 (2d Cir. 2006); People v. Li Ai Hua, 885 N.Y.S.2d 380, 383 (Crim. Ct.
2009) (confusing the material element test with the predominant purpose test by requiring the game of “Mah Jong”
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argued that poker games were games of skill. The court held that a "‘contest of chance’
encompasses games in which the skill of the contestants may play a role, as long as the outcome
depends in a material degree on chance.”97 The court provided no definition, analysis, or standard
in holding that the games were illegal gambling, as the issue was a secondary matter in this case.98
Another minority test, the Gambling Instinct Test, is a subjective test assessing whether a
game appeals to the gambling instinct of the participant.99 However, the predominant purpose test
is used by a majority of states and is the most workable of the three.100
b. MAJORITY TEST: PREDOMINANT PURPOSE TEST
If chance predominates skill by comprising at least fifty-one percent or more of a game’s
outcome, then the predominance test is satisfied.101 In Commonwealth v. Two Elec. Poker Game
Machs., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied the predominant purpose test to hold that the
outcome of virtual poker was determined predominately by chance. 102 Showing a substantial
element of chance will not suffice in establishing a predominance of chance over skill.103 While

contain a dominating element of chance that determines the result of the game, not merely an element of either
chance or skill).
97
Id.
98
Id. The case involved the prosecution of the Gotti crime family on a sixty-eight count indictment, with focus
primarily set on several counts of extortion. Hence, the circumstances of the case may have may have effected
judgment against the defendants on the illegal gambling count.
99
See, e.g. State v. One Hundred & Fifty-Eight Gaming Devices, 304 Md. 404, 436 (1985) (applying the gambling
instinct test in holding that “coin-activated, free-play devices in [the defendant’s] possession, which involved an
element of chance and which were equipped with odds mechanisms, or a meter for recording the number of free
plays released, or other established indicia of a gambling device, are illegal slot machines because they appeal to the
gambling instinct of individuals); State v. Vance, 2004 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 317, at *40 (Crim. App. Apr. 8,
2004) (holding the “operation of the Free Spin machines fell within the definition of ‘gambling’ because the
machines were used to risk credits worth five cents apiece for a profit whose return was contingent on chance”
appealing to the gambler’s instinct); see also Okerberg, supra note 91.
100
See Id.
101
See Okerberg supra note 91.
102
See Two Elec., 502 Pa. at 195.
103
Id. at 194.
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the mix of skill and chance comprise mostly all imaginable games, “chance ultimately determines
the outcome because chance determines the cards dealt and the cards from which one can draw.”104
The court weighed the statistical arguments made in finding that skill was indeed
present.105 The defendant’s expert witness testified that outcomes differed when using "smart," as
opposed to “dumb,” strategies.106 The former involved a player employing his knowledge of
statistics, and the latter involved the player "standing pat" on the initial hand dealt by the
machine.107 When playing smart, a player won at a four and a half times greater rate. Nonetheless,
the court held that even though skill—knowledge of probabilities—may improve a player’s
winning odds, because there was a “random element” of which cards were ultimately dealt, chance
determined the outcome.108
V.

STATE LAW LANDSCAPE: DIFFERING STATE APPROACHES ON PROHIBITING SPORTS
WAGERING AND ILLEGAL GAMBLING AND HOW DFS FIT INTO THE DISCUSSION
a. NEW YORK
Gambling laws in New York are not radically different from those in New Jersey. The

New York Constitution prohibits legislative authorization of lottery or the sale of lottery tickets,
pool-selling, book-making, or any other kind of gambling except when a lottery is conducted by
the State in which proceeds are reserved for State education.109 The New York Constitution
authorizes the legislature to codify preventative enactments to enforce this provision.110 Paragraph
2 of the same section authorizes the majority of qualified electors to vote to validate games of

104

Id. at 196.
Id. at 195.
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Id.
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Id.
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See Two Elec., 502 Pa. at 195–96.
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N.Y. CONST. art I, § 9, para. 1.
110
Id.
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chance—such as a lottery based on the random matching of symbols on cards or the awarding of
prizes based on the random drawing of numbers—subject to government control.111
New York defines a game of chance as “any contest, game, gaming scheme or gaming
devise in which the outcome depends in a material degree upon an element of chance,
notwithstanding that skill of the contestants may also be a factor therein.”112 The same section
notes three elements determining whether an activity is gambling: when an individual (1) stakes
or risks something of value (2) on the outcome of a contest of chance or a future contingent event
not under his control or influence, (3) upon an agreement or understanding that he will receive
something of value in the event of a certain outcome.113 Something of value is defined as “any
money or property, [or] any token, object or article exchangeable for money.”114 Furthermore, it
can be credit or future promise of entry into a game without charge.115
i. ATTORNEY GENERAL SCHNEIDERMAN OPPOSES DFS
New York has recently taken a drastic stance in the legal debate over DFS. Attorney
General Eric Schneiderman has sent a cease and desist letter to DFS providers to discontinue
operation and refrain from accepting entry fees.116 AG Schneiderman has since filed for a
preliminary injunction in the New York Court of Appeals to enjoin FanDuel and DraftKings from
continuing DFS activity in New York.117 AG Schneiderman’s complaint suggests that the “the
speed of DraftKings’ [and Fanduel’s] games, the size of their jackpots, and the degree to which
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N.Y. CONST. art I, § 9, para. 2.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 225.00 (Consol. 2016) (emphasis added).
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
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David Bario and Jake Pearson, Fantasy Sports Companies Challenge AG Ban in Court, NEW YORK LAW
JOURNAL (Nov. 16, 2015), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202742379722/Fantasy-Sports-CompaniesChallenge-AG-Ban-in-Court?slreturn=20160225172012.
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Id.
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the games are sold as winnable,” resembles illegal sports gambling and thus both companies should
be enjoined from continuing operations.118
According to the AG, DFS fall squarely into the category of illegal gambling because it
consists of a wager based on (a) a contingent future event that is beyond the participants control
and (b) a contest dependent on chance.119 The AG further takes issue with DFS’s large scale “easy
to play and easy to win” style advertising and its tendency to promote the game as a lottery.120 AG
Schneiderman acknowledges the traditional/daily dichotomy in that the former was primarily
engaged in for bragging rights or side wagers, while the latter offers massive jackpots. 121 AG
Schneiderman concludes that DFS pose risks to New York residents who suffer from compulsive
gambling.122 He argues that DFS cause the precise harms that the New York gambling laws in
place seek to eradicate.123
ii. AG SCHNEIDERMAN TRIUMPHANT AT TRIAL LEVEL; DFS SET TO APPEAL
AG Schneiderman has passed the first level of scrutiny at the trial level in December
2015.124 Judge Manuel Mendez held that "the language of Penal Law §225.00 is broadly worded
and as currently written sufficient for finding that DFS involves illegal gambling.”125 Judge
Mendez concluded that the UIGEA exception does not apply under the state law’s language and
thus the defendants—FanDuel and DraftKings—are enjoined from doing business in the state of
New York.126 Furthermore, Judge Mendez rejected FanDuel and DraftKings’ due process claim
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Complaint at 2, Schneiderman v. DraftKings, Inc., No. 453054 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Nov. 17, 2015).
Brief for Plaintiff at 1, Schneiderman v. DraftKings, Inc., No. 453054 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Nov. 17, 2015).
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Id. at 9 (noting that in the first ten months of 2015, FanDuel has spent $12 million in advertising alone).
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Id. at 11.
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Id.
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Id.
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People v. Fanduel, Inc., 2015 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4521 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 11, 2015).
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Id. at 17; see supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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People v. Fanduel, Inc., 2015 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4521 at 18.
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because there had been an opportunity to be heard by AG Schneiderman and the presiding Court.127
Judge Mendez also rejected DraftKings’ equal protection argument because it failed to show other
similarly situated DFS websites exempted from AG Schneiderman’s investigation.128 A New York
Appellate court has since stayed Judge Mendez’s approval of AG Schneiderman’s motion to enjoin
the DFS sites’ activity.129 The fate of DFS in New York will be reconsidered in May 2016 by the
New York Appellate Division, First Department.130
b. NEW JERSEY: THE GRASS IS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE HUDSON
New Jersey’s legislative history reflects its opposition to legalizing gambling and sports
wagering outside of the gambler’s Atlantic City safe-haven.131 Nonetheless, New Jersey, in
comparison to other states, is relatively pro-gambling considering its attempt to amend its
constitution to allow gambling laws to pass.132 In relevant part, the New Jersey Constitution
prohibited its legislature from authorizing gambling of any kind unless the “kind, restrictions, and
control” are voted on and approved by a majority of qualified voters at a general or special
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Id. at 20.
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Andrew Keshner, Life of Fantasy Sports Sites In NY Is Extended Until May, NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL (Jan. 12,
2016), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202746799270/Life-of-Fantasy-Sports-Sites-in-NY-Is-ExtendedUntil-May.
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election.133 Put differently, New Jersey residents would have to vote affirmatively to effectuate a
legal gambling scheme anywhere outside of Atlantic City.134
Support for an amendment came primarily from Atlantic City investors and casinos, such
as the Casino Association of New Jersey and Trump Entertainment Resorts Inc., among others.135
Their general argument was that the legalization of sports wagers would provide a significant boost
to Atlantic City’s decrepit economy.136 Public Question 1 of the November 8, 2011 New Jersey
municipal election ballot was approved by a sixty-four percent majority of voters.137

The

amendment added two provisions—focusing on what previously outlawed sports wagering—that
allowed the legislature to authorize (1) sports betting on the results of any professional, college, or
amateur sport or athletic event, and (2) wagering at running and harness horse racetracks in this
State.138 The amendment’s only notable opposition came from Harrah’s Entertainment—who

Section D of the Paragraph 2 limits casinos’ operation of gambling schemes to the Atlantic City, New Jersey
locale. All gambling proceeds shall “be applied solely for the purpose of providing funding for reductions in
property taxes, rental, telephone, gas, electric, and municipal utilities charges of eligible senior citizens and disabled
residents of the State, and for additional or expanded health services or benefits or transportation services or benefits
to eligible senior citizens and disabled residents, in accordance with such formulae as the Legislature shall by law
provide.” N.J. CONST., ART. IV, SEC. VII, PARA. 2.
134
Id.
135
Baily Ludlam, New Jersey Sports Betting Amendment, Public Question 1 (2011), BALLOTPEDIA,
http://ballotpedia.org/New_Jersey_Sports_Betting_Amendment,_Public_Question_1_(2011) (last accessed Nov. 16,
2015).
136
The legalization of sports betting can provide a potential boost of approximately $2.7 billion, which is what
sports wagering grossed in 2010 in Las Vegas. Atlantic City anticipated a revenue boost of around $200 million in
its first year of offering legalized sports betting. During the time of the amendment and subsequent complimentary
legislation, 98 percent—which equated to tens of billions of dollars—of sports bets were wagered illegally in the
U.S. or online through foreign gambling websites. See Chris Sieroty, Sports Betting Possible in New Jersey, LAS
VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL (Sept. 17, 2011), http://www.reviewjournal.com/sports/betting/sports-betting-possiblenew-jersey.
137
The final tally was 648,769 for and 367,283 against the measure. See New Jersey Municipal Election Results,
STAR LEDGER (Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.nj.com/starledger/results-ballot/.
138
The language of the amendments imposes limitations on wagers on contests that involve a New Jersey College
team or on collegiate contests that occur within the state. However, the amendment permits the usage of a wagering
device, telephone, or the internet to place bets on all other sports contests. N.J. CONST., ART. IV, SEC. VII, PARA. 2.
The ballot presented the amendment to voters using the following language:
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Shall the amendment to Article IV, Section VII, paragraph 2 of the Constitution of the State of New
Jersey, agreed to by the Legislature, providing that it shall be lawful for the Legislature to authorize
by law wagering at casinos or gambling houses in Atlantic City and at racetracks, in-person or
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claimed it was premature considering the lingering federal ban—which evidently turned out to be
true.139 Also, the National Football League opposed the expansion of any sports betting outside
of Nevada.140
New Jersey residents unequivocally supported a legal, regulated gambling scheme.141
Naturally, the New Jersey Legislature exercised its newly acquired authority by passing the Sports
Wagering Act. 142 New Jersey’s law made it legal, upon its Division of Law’s approval, to operate
sports pools in casinos and racetracks.143 The law required that an individual who has reached the
age of 21 be physically present in a sports pool lounge—one with conforming physical dimensions,
security measures, and equipment.144 Section 5:12A-1 defines a sports pool using the broad
language of the “business of accepting wagers on any sports event by any system or method of
wagering.”145 However, these amendments and ensuing legislation directly contradicted the
prohibitions in PASPA.146 Consequently, opposition came from the four major national sports
leagues, but most troublesome for New Jersey and its recent measure, was the opposition it faced
from the courts.

through an account wagering system, on the results of professional, certain college, or amateur sport
or athletic events, be approved?
Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 49 State of New Jersey, 214th Legislature, available at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2010/Bills/SCR/49_I1.PDF.
139
See Christie I, 730 F.3d 208. See also discussion accompanying infra note 147.
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See STAR LEDGER, supra note 137,
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N.J. STAT. ANN. ANN. § 5:12A-2.
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N.J. STAT. ANN. ANN. § 5:12A-1, et seq.
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See Sieroty, supra note 136.
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i. TENSION BETWEEN FEDERAL LAW AND STATE LAW: NCAA V. GOVERNOR OF
N.J. (CHRISTIE I)
On September 17, 2013, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the New Jersey
District Court’s granting of summary judgment to enjoin New Jersey’s efforts to license gambling
in NCAA v. Governor of N.J. (“Christie I”).147 The NFL, NHL, MLB, NBA, and the NCAA,
(collectively “the Leagues”), joined by the United States as an intervening party, argued that New
Jersey’s law permitting sports wagering on their contests violated PASPA.148 New Jersey’s
substantive arguments challenged the constitutionality of PASPA raising an anti-commandeering
claim, which states that the federal government may not commandeer state governments, as well
as a state equal sovereignty claim.149
Judge Fuentes first held that the Leagues had standing because an injury in fact is
established (a) in the cognizable harm of being associated with activity they and the public
disapprove of, namely gambling, and (b) the increased “negative perceptions” of fans will result
from the increased amount of gambling on sports and thus sustain damage to the Leagues’
reputation.150 Reaching the merits of the case, Judge Fuentes next held that PASPA is within reach
of Congress’ commerce clause powers because both gambling and national sporting contests
substantially affect interstate commerce.151 Next, Judge Fuentes held that PASPA does not violate
the anti-commandeering doctrine because New Jersey can choose to repeal its anti-sport wagering
laws.152
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See Christie I, 730 F.3d 208.
Id. at 214.
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Id.
150
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Finally, Judge Fuentes held that PASPA does not violate the equal sovereignty of the
states.153

First, because uniformity does not limit Congress’ Commerce power to regulate

commercial activity, which consequently may lead to different treatment among the states, there
is no equal sovereignty violation.154 Second, because laws remedying local evils are but one
reason, and not the only reason, to treat states differently, no violation exists.155 Third, just because
PASPA treats one state more and not less favorably, there is not necessarily a violation.156
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Vinaskie agreed with the majority in all aspects except for
in regards to the commandeering principle.157

Judge Vinaskie would have held PASPA

unconstitutional because it gives states a choice to either allow or prohibit unregulated betting on
sporting events.158 Thus, according to Judge Vinaskie, PASPA regulates state governments’
regulation, which violates the anti-commandeering principle.159

Given the slim two-to-one

majority, a hearing en banc has since been granted in NCAA v. Rebuck.160
ii. FANTASY SPORTS ENTER
VIACOM, INC.

THE ILLEGAL

GAMBLING DEBATE: HUMPHREY V.

In Humphrey, Defendants operated “pay-for-play” fantasy websites in which participants
paid an entry fee to purchase a fantasy team and the associated services.161 Essentially, participants
paid to participate in a fantasy league that the defendant hosts provided. 162 Plaintiff alleged that
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the entry fees amounted to wagers or bets and thus under qui tam gambling recovery statutes he is
eligible to recover the entry fees.163
Presiding United States District Judge Dennis M. Cavanaugh first dismissed Plaintiff’s qui
tam recovery claim because he lacked the necessary elements by not pleading (a) the identity of
the loser(s), (b) the amount of each loser's loss, (c) when the loss occurred, and (d) the nature of
the "wager" or "bet" made with either of the Defendants.164 Furthermore, Plaintiff failed to allege,
as required by the New Jersey qui tam statute, that (a) Plaintiff successfully and (b) each "loser"
unsuccessfully brought suit within six months of losing the bet.165 Second, Judge Cavanaugh held
that the entry fees do not amount to bets or wagers because (a) the entry fees are unconditional,
and (b) the prizes are guaranteed to be awarded and thus are absent of the risk necessary to
constitute a wager.166 The court held that reasonable entry fees are not bets or wagers where the
contest’s sponsor guarantees a prize (i.e., when the sponsor is not competing for the prize).167
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Id. at 6.
Id. at 16.
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Id. at 17.
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While Judge Cavanaugh did not find it necessary to reach the merits on whether the kind of fantasy sport offered
here was a game of chance or skill, he did offer insight into the skill required when competing with participants
within or outside of one’s own league:
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The success of a fantasy sports team depends on the participants' skill in selecting players for his or
her team, trading players over the course of the season, adding and dropping players during the
course of the season and deciding who among his or her players will start and which players will be
placed on the bench. The team with the best performance—based upon the statistics of the players
chosen by the participant—is declared the winner at the season's end.
Humphrey v. Viacom, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44679, at *21 (citing Las Vegas Hacienda v. Gibson, 359 P.2d
85 (Nev. 1961)).
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c. NEW JERSEY AND CALIFORNIA OFFER THE DFS SOLUTION: NEW JERSEY’S INTERNET
GAMING SCHEME, THE WHELAN BILL AND AB 1437
i. INTERNET GAMING MADE LEGAL
STRUCTURE FOR DFS

IN

NEW JERSEY PROVIDING

THE

MODEL

New Jersey further sought, in the interest of Atlantic City’s revitalization, to legalize
internet gambling within the state’s borders through its February 26, 2013 Casino Control Act
amendment (“CCA Amendment”).168 Licensed casinos may offer, via express authority granted
in the CCA Amendment, internet gaming to consumers in New Jersey. 169 The CCA Amendment
promises “a robust casino gaming industry that is capable of competing regionally, nationally, and
internationally at the highest levels of quality” that simultaneously “retain[s] strict State regulatory
oversight to ensure the integrity of all casino gaming operations conducted in [New Jersey].”170
An additional reason for the implementation of legal internet gaming is attributed to the prior
rampant participation in illegal gambling of unregulated, off-shore operators.171
According to David Deitch, a former New York Assistant District Attorney and U.S.
District Attorney for the District of Columbia, safeguards are integrated into the CCA Amendment
that serves to maintain the integrity of internet gaming.172 For instance, a gaming provider—
whether it be a casino or an affiliate—must complete the full casino licensing application as well
as obtain a permit from the New Jersey Division of Law.173 This rigorous process is certain to
attract those already established internet-gaming companies (companies such as DraftKings and
FanDuel), who would be capable of pursuing such a venture. 174 According to Deitch, what makes
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David B. Deitch, New Jersey: Taking the Lead in Offering Internet Gaming to the World, European Gaming
Lawyer, available at http://www.ifrahlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/EGL_Spring2013.pdf.
169
Id.
170
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-95.17(e) (West 2015).
171
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-95.17(f) (West 2015).
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See Deitch, supra note 168.
173
Id.
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Id.
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the gaming structure appealing is Section 29 of the CCA Amendment, which allows those not
physically present within New Jersey to wager over the internet.175 A degree of control is
maintained by restricting all internet gaming hardware, software, and other equipment to casino
facilities in Atlantic City.176 These measures are implemented to maintain “secur[ity] [and]
inaccessib[ility] to the public” and will keep equipment “under the complete control of a casino
licensee or its internet gaming affiliate.”177
By allowing foreign participants outside of U.S. borders to place online wagers or
participate in gaming, the CCA Amendment installs two restrictions: first, gambling must be
permitted in the foreign country where the participant resides; and second, New Jersey must enter
into a reciprocal agreement with the foreign nation to facilitate online gaming. 178 While the first
restriction is arguably not much of a hurdle, Deicht concedes that the second restriction may be
subject to more scrutiny.179 Ultimately, however, after considering the myriad of controlling
federal law, Deicht concludes that allowing foreign participants to engage in New Jersey based
online gambling would not be contrary to Federal law.180
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The language included in Assembly Bill 2578 was specifically phrased:
Wagers may be accepted thereunder from persons who are not physically present in this State if the
Division of Gaming Enforcement in the Department of Law and Public Safety determines that such
wagering is not inconsistent with federal law or the law of the jurisdiction, including any foreign
nation, in which any such person is located, or such wagering is conducted pursuant to a reciprocal
agreement to which this State is a party that is not inconsistent with federal law.

2012 Bill Text NJ A.B. 2578.
176
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-95.17(j) (West 2015).
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Id.
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See Deicht, supra note 168.
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Id.
180
Deitch concludes the Federal Wire Act of 1961 (“FWA”) would probably not serve to barricade foreign wagers
because only sport wagers are within the purview of this Act. Id. The FWA prohibits the knowing use of wire
communication to transmit money or credit in relation to bets or wagers. 18 U.S.C.S. § 1084. Furthermore, because
Federal laws rely on State law to determine what unlawful betting, wagering, or internet gambling means, the
UIGEA and the Internet Gambling Business Act—which prohibits a person engaged in the business of betting or
wagering from accepting money transfers for unlawful internet gambling—are unlikely to pose as an impediment on
internet gaming. See Deicht, supra note 168
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One of the most attractive aspects of the scheme compels the New Jersey Division of
Gaming Enforcement (“NJDGE”) to produce a report on the impact of internet gambling on
problem gamblers.181 An independent report conducted by Lia Nower of the Rutgers Center for
Gambling Studies concluded that internet gambling provides an additional medium for individuals
with high risk gambling problems.182 In the span of one year, internet gaming accounts rose from
126,231 in 2013 to 531,626 by December of 2014.183 Likewise, the internet gaming revenue rose
substantially each month, generating a total of $131.2 million since its inception. 184 New Jersey
benefited from this growth, collecting fifteen percent of total revenue in taxes, while two percent
was apportioned to the Casino Reinvestment Development Authority.185 The Research Report
concluded that New Jersey’s legalized internet gambling scheme is clearly directed at facilitating
informed and responsible gambling choices among its consumers.186 The measures ensure that a
high-risk gambler will not engage in reckless gambling.187
Finally, the CCA Amendment makes tampering with odds or payouts, or with the
equipment affecting odds or payouts, a crime in the third degree.188 Those operators in violation
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N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-95.18 (West 2015).
Lia Nower, Internet Gaming in New Jersey Calendar Year 2014 Report to the Division of
Gaming Enforcement, RUTGERS UNIVERSITY (February 2015), available at
http://www.nj.gov/oag/ge/2015news/ResponsibleGamingFinalReport%202015.pdf.
183
Id. at 10.
184
The month of December 2014 saw a substantial growth from previous months, accumulating $10.7 million in
revenue. Id. at 11.
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Id. The Casino Reinvestment Development Authority is an agency that reinvests casino revenue for the wellbeing of New Jersey residents. Its initiative is to “provide capital investment funds for economic development and
community projects that respond to the changing economic and social needs of Atlantic City and the State of New
Jersey . . . by encourage[ing] business development and permanent job creation . . . .” Casino Reinvestment
Development Authority, About Us, available at http://www.njcrda.com/about-us/ (last accessed Nov. 16, 2015).
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See Nower, supra note 182, at 12. New Jersey has succeeded in curbing the gambler’s appetite to reckless
gambling by implementing preventative measures to limit excess wagering. According to the report, (a) providing
the elapsed time a participant has spent gambling; (b) supplying gambling helpline and informational resources, (c)
providing account and game history; (d) giving participants options to set limits on losses, deposits,
time played; (e) requiring a three day “cool off” period; and (f) providing an opportunity for one to exclude
themselves from all internet gaming sites through the Division. Id. at 9.
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See Id.
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See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-95.27–28 (West 2015).
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are subject to not more than a $50,000 fine, and for unnatural persons, not more than a $200,000
fine.189
Moreover, those violating these provisions are required to forfeit their permit and
license.190 The scheme used in New Jersey to regulate internet gambling is a suitable solution for
the quasi-gambling nature of DFS. Implementing a regulatory scheme at the Federal level modeled
after New Jersey’s internet gaming legislation will allow consumers to safely play DFS while
simultaneously inhibiting the growth of gambling addiction and raising United States revenue
through taxation. This is a scheme that will decrease the profits that DFS providers currently reap,
but it sufficiently balances the government’s interest in protecting consumers while allowing the
activity enjoyed by consumers to flourish.
ii. THE WHELAN BILL
Given New Jersey’s online gambling landscape, the state is poised to lead the way in DFS
regulation and legalization and serve as the model for federal law. State Senator Jim Whelan
proposed a bill (“Whelan Bill”) that has received mixed responses from DraftKings.191

On

November 3, 2015, DraftKings promulgated to seemingly all of its New Jersey-based customers
an email aimed at the heart of those “who love to play fantasy sports.”192 DraftKings pleaded for
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Id.
Id.
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2016 Bill Text NJ S.B. 1927 (herein after “Whelan Bill”).
192
NJ.com, DraftKings urges N.J. users to contact legislators in email sent to customers,
http://www.nj.com/giants/index.ssf/2015/11/draftkings_urges_nj_users_to_contact_legislators_i.html (last accessed
Nov. 6, 2015). This particular email was sent following the circulation of a petition initiated by DraftKings and
nationally by the Fantasy Sports Trade Association. The petition simply requests that DFS users endorse a
statement claiming that fantasy sports adds excitement to sports, creates communal interactions, and tests
competitors’ sports knowledge against others. Bostlnno, Here's DraftKings' 1st Attempt to Mobilize Its Users [Full
Text]: The company emailed its users in NJ asking them to sign a petition,
http://bostinno.streetwise.co/2015/11/04/nj-daily-fantasy-ban-draftkings-petition-to-new-jersey-residents/ (last
accessed Nov. 11, 2015). The FSTA uses similar language in its petition on its website:
190

As your constituent and one of the millions of fantasy sports players here in New Jersey, I urge you
to protect my right to enjoy fantasy sports. Playing fantasy sports is not about the money. It’s about
the challenge, the skill, the fun, and connecting with friends, family, and coworkers. I urge you to
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its New Jersey DFS users to contact their legislators to oppose “any measure that would restrict
[the] ability to play fantasy sports in New Jersey.”193 The email’s gravamen seeks to protect the
game of daily fantasy sports by maintaining its accessibility.194
Ironically enough, the proposed bill does not call for the declaration of DFS as illegal
gambling.195 Perhaps the reason, at that point in time, that DraftKings apparently opposed the
Whelan Bill was due to the potential financial repercussions that it is sure to impose on DFS
operators. Being somewhat apropos, the Whelan Bill’s deliberation comes amid New Jersey’s
Third Circuit Appeal en banc in NCAA v. Governor of New Jersey, discussed supra, reviewing the
Constitutionality of the legalization of gambling as proposed by a state constitutional
amendment.196
The Whelan Bill would make DFS safe for consumers while maintaining the integrity of
the subjected sports. Particularly, Whelan insists that his tentative bill does not seek to ban fantasy
sports but that it “make[s] sure fantasy sports competition is fair, impartial, and transparent to
everyone.”197 Indeed the bill would declare “[a] daily fantasy sports game [as] a game of skill and
shall not be considered to be a game of chance.”198 So why are petitions circulating in hopes of

oppose any measure that would restrict the ability to play fantasy sports in New Jersey, and to
support keeping fantasy sports accessible for everyone in our state. Stand with your constituents,
like me, who support #FantasyforAll. Thank you.
FSTA Fantasy Sports Trade Association, Protect Fantasy Sports in NJ!
http://salsa4.salsalabs.com/o/51362/p/dia/action3/common/public/?action_KEY=16357&utm_source=Dail
yEmail&utm_medium=Email&utm_content=http%3a%2f%2fsalsa4.salsalabs.com%2fo%2f51362%2fp%2
fdia%2faction3%2fcommon%2fpublic%2f%3faction_KEY%3d16357&utm_campaign=
193
Id.
194
Id. Of course DraftKings did not fail to reinforce its belief in the legality of daily fantasy sports, noting the social
appeal of DFS in “connecting with friends, family, and co-workers,” and that the basis of its contests are “about the
challenge [and] the skill.”
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The bill is merely a draft and has not been filed with the legislature. Cite bill in my email See id.
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National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208 (2013). A hearing en banc has been
granted by NCAA v. Rebuck, see supra note 160.
197
Letter from Jim Whelan, New Jersey Senator, to Director Rebuck and Chairman Levinson (Oct. 30, 2015)
(available at http://files.ctctcdn.com/38874f71101/a6770444-dc15-40b4-ba7b-393dc11deef9.pdf).
198
See Whelan Bill, supra note 191, at section 1(c).
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garnering New Jersey DFS participants’ support? The primary reason is that the Whalen Bill
overhauls the current scheme, adopting one that is purely intrastate as opposed to interstate; a move
that could send DFS providers packing.199
Unlike the UIGEA, the Whelan Bill defines fantasy sports more broadly to specifically
include DFS within its regulatory reach.200 The language is specifically catered for fantasy sports
and defines the term as any fantasy contest between participants “determined by statistics
generated based on performance by actual individuals participating in actual professional or
collegiate athletic events.”201 Consistent with the UIGEA, the outcome of the contest must be
based off of the relative skill of the participants.202 The Whelan Bill would retain the prohibition
on “sports betting” by disallowing the placement of wagers on the score or spread of an individual
contests or the performance of an individual player.203 DFS, like traditional fantasy sports, would
pass muster because wagers hardly resemble bets based solely on the outcome of real-life games.
The accumulation of statistics from individual performances determine DFS outcomes, regardless
of what team the individual plays for.
Furthermore, the definition of “fantasy sports providers” provides the rhetoric that has DFS
providers concerned.204 It prohibits authorized DFS operators from accepting entries from those
not physically present in the state.205 According to the Whelan Bill, a DFS provider must be issued
a permit through the approval of the NJDGE.206 The fees associated with licensing a DFS provider
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Dustin Gouker, New Jersey Bill Would Treat Daily Fantasy Sports Pretty Much Like Regulated Online
Gambling, Except For Actually Calling It Gambling, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (Nov. 2, 2015),
http://www.legalsportsreport.com/5762/nj-dfs-bill/.
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See Whelan Bill, supra note 191.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
206
Article 2 of the Casino Control Act, establishes the NJDGE. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-55 (West 2015). The
division is established in Atlantic City, New Jersey with satellite operation in Trenton, New Jersey, and is under the
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would cover the Division’s cost of overseeing the conduct of DFS operators.207 The Whelan Bill
proposes similar conditions to those established by the UIGEA, including: “(a) the outcome of the
contest must be determined by statistics of individual athletes, (b) prizes must be predetermined,
(c) the outcome must not be based solely on the performance of an individual athlete, the score, a
point spread, or any individual team performance and, (d) a patron must be 21 years of age to
participate.”208 Additional provisions include the permission of a mobile wagering account
allowing patrons to submit entry fees to a casino licensee’s facilities so as long as contests are
conducted in New Jersey alone.209
iii. CALIFORNIA FORESHADOWS THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE FOR DFS BY ADOPTING
NEW JERSEY’S APPROACH: PASSES BILL AB 1437
California has taken the step to implement the framework for DFS regulation by passing
committee chairman Adam Gray’s bill (“AB 1437”) in January 2016.210 AB 1437 faced very little
opposition passing seventeen to one by the Assembly Governmental Organization Committee.211
Gray noted that millions play in what is currently an unprotected consumer market. 212 Some
concerns mounted by committee members involved the assurance of whether there exists enough
funding to adequately monitor online operators and to keep minors from participating.213

direction of appointed Assistant Attorney General and Director David L. Rebuck. See The State of New Jersey
Department of Law & Public Safety Office of the Attorney General, Director of the Division of Gaming
Enforcement, http://www.nj.gov/oag/ge/director.htm. The primary goal of the NJDGE is to “protect the public
interest by maintaining a legitimate and viable industry, free from the influences of organized crime, and assuring
the honesty, good character and integrity of casino owners, operators, employees and vendors.”
http://www.nj.gov/oag/ge/mission&duties.htm. Article 5 authorizes the NJDGE to generally grant certificates of
operation and casino gaming licenses; audit casinos’ financial records and accounting; create and enforce
regulations; license, regulate, and investigate gaming over the internet; and among other similar duties, establish a
patron exclusion list. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-76 (West 2015).
207
See Whelan Bill, supra note 191.
208
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209
Id.
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Cheryl Miller, Fantasy Sports Sites Meet Weak Opposition in Calif., THE RECORDER (Jan. 6, 2016).
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Nonetheless, the bill received overwhelming support in moving forward as it continues to be
crafted.214
AB 1437 adds chapter 4.7, entitled the Internet Fantasy Sports Games Consumer Protection
Act, to Division 8 of the Business and Professions Code and amends the California Penal Code.215
The bill acknowledges the central issue surrounding DFS nationwide in Article 1, Section
19752(c):
Neither federal nor California laws provide any consumer
protections for California players. California players assume all
risks, any negative social or financial impacts are borne by the
citizens of California, and the revenues generated from these games
are being realized by unlicensed operators and do not provide any
benefits to the citizens of California.216
The bill proposes a sensible remedy to the potential harms of DFS by establishing a licensing
scheme to control DFS operators.217 It is a concise and progressive adaptation of gaming law that
inadvertently conjoins the principles of New Jersey’s CCA amendment and the Whelan Bill. AB
1437 seeks to ensure that gameplay is offered consistent with the law, the state is capable of
collecting its share of taxes, and that the consumer is protected in gameplay and collections of
prizes.218 Before DFS is offered to California consumers, Article 3 of AB 1437 requires an
operator to apply for and receive a license from the California Department of Justice.219 Section
19772 echoes the UIGEA fantasy carve-out provisions; however, no requirement of skill is
included.220
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AB 1437 requires the California DOJ to determine whether an applicant meets the good character and integrity
provision, and is capable of paying 19782 one-time license fee. This fee has yet to be determined. Id.
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This section (1) prohibits an imaginary team being based on the current membership of an amateur or
professional sports team, (2) requires prizes be disclosed prior to the contest, (3) prohibits prizes from being
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Furthermore, a licensed operator is responsible for providing adequate data security
measures and determining participant eligibility.221 Section 19774(f) establishes a system that
authorizes the state to levy fees on provision violators.222 Section 19780 creates the Fantasy Sports
Fund in the State Treasury.223 Annual regulatory fees to be paid by operators will be deposited in
the Fantasy Sports Fund.224 The annual fee is to be determined by the California DOJ based on
“the reasonable costs of license oversight, consumer protection, state regulation, problem
gambling programs, and . . . enforcement efforts related to illegal Internet gambling activities.”225
The passing of AB 1437 may ultimately prove to be a landmark step towards extinguishing
the chaos that has ensued from the inception of DFS. All of the desirable facets of the New Jersey
online gambling scheme are implemented in this bill. It provides California with an additional
taxation resource while simultaneously allowing consumers to participate in a safer version of the
fantasy game that its citizens have grown fond of.
VI.

ANALYSIS: ARE DFS A GAME OF CHANCE OR A GAME OF SKILL?
This analysis will show that daily fantasy sports are no less skill-based than traditional

fantasy sports—which have long been accepted as a non-gambling activity—and perhaps more
skill-based.

This analysis discusses the reasons DFS are skill-based in juxtaposition with

traditional fantasy sports.226 Under current federal law, DFS are operating legally pursuant to

contingent on the number of participants or entry fees, and (4) winning may not be based on point spreads or the
performance of any individual player. Id.
221
The verification responsibilities include verifying credit card identity, verifying that the participant is at least
twenty-one years of age, and verifying a participant’s location in California. Id.
222
Fees range between $1,000 for a first-time violator to $10,000 for an operators fifth violation. Id.
223
2015 Bill Text CA A.B. 1437.
224
Id.
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Id.
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A Survey consisting of 1,420 participants reflects the relevance of traditional sports. Sixty-one percent of those
who play DFS are also in at least one season-long fantasy sports league. The survey was marketed through social
media websites and was conducted from June 18 through July 9, 2015. See Adam Krejcik, Daily Fantasy Sports
Player Survey – 2015, EILERS RESEARCH (July 14, 2015),
https://courier.bluematrix.com/Courier/EmailDocViewer.action?info=vNnixFYyhd4FCmyi2AiiGw5bKPLv9kYz%2
BZwoDtUOHirWYkn0AQzNKxEiRrGphv6zdodk2GDWPv%2FX%0AC%2BhzuqMlBWLef97PSR8CVyMr2Di1P
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UIGEA’s fantasy sports carve-out.227

First, all prizes are made known to participants in

advance.228 Second, winning outcomes are determined predominately by the relative knowledge
of skill by the accumulation of statistical results of real professional players. 229 Third, DFS
operators provide barriers that restrict individuals from betting on (1) the score or outcome of a
single professional sports contest and (2) the performance of a single athlete.230
But does the UIEGA fantasy carve-out absolve DFS operators from the penalties that
illegal gambling is subject to? Considering the UIEGA was enacted in 2006, before DFS were
created, it arguably does not apply to DFS.231 In fact, Jim Leach, a Republican congressman who
co-authored UIGEA, has stated that the carve-out was considered more of a footnote, and that “[i]t
was never much discussed during consideration of UIGEA because [fantasy sports] was
considered like horse racing, already part of the American betting scene.”232 Of course, it is the
language of the law that governs, not the intent of a co-author; and DFS comply with the blackletter language of the federal law as written.233
Given that the minority tests are unworkable, as they inject subjectivity into the equation,
for the purpose of this analysis, the predominant purpose majority test will be the lens through
which DFS are viewed.234 There are various reasons why skill predominates over chance: first, an
unprecedented amount of time and research is required to succeed in fantasy sports; second, a

opPVRmAbIdrG1Y9nnc0GOwivhqCSj7Nl6M9WmRaDJJk4Vfu%0AazRheD6QQr6vQsok1GU%3D%0A
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participant’s actions have a significant effect on his outcome; third, certain variables of chance are
virtually eliminated in a daily format, such as injuries and player rest; and fourth, there are varying
skill-levels that can increase over time. Nonetheless, when money is involved, there must be a
buffer in place to protect the integrity of the real games, and thus regulations are necessary. In
sum, DFS should not be considered illegal gambling because its outcome is not predominantly
determined by chance. Instead, a federal regulatory scheme is appropriate given the lines dividing
illegal gambling and legal contests continue to blur.
a. DFS ARE PREDOMINANTLY A GAME OF SKILL BECAUSE TIME
NECESSARY TO EARN PROFITABLE WINNINGS

AND

RESEARCH

IS

First, DFS are predominantly skill-based because participants must be studious of the
particular sport that their fantasy contest entry is in. Substantial amounts of time must be set aside
for preparation and research in both traditional and daily fantasy. The connotation “daily” often
causes opponents of DFS to overlook the required research. In a survey conducted by Eilers
Research, consisting of 1,420 individuals reporting, those who allegedly play DFS admitted that
between ten and twenty hours a week were reserved for fantasy research.235 A whopping 84.3
percent of DFS players reported to have spent over five hours of research a week. 236 Those
surveyed who do not play DFS, reported that the reason for excluding themselves was because
they were “too intimidate[ed]” or that the game was too “time consuming.”237
Of those investing money into DFS contests, a thirty-five percent majority reported that
they had broken even or made a return on their investment (“ROI”) of twenty percent.238 Given

The survey notes that an overwhelming majority of research is performed through Rotogrinders’ website—a
fantasy sports news source. See Eilers Research, supra note 226 at 21.
236
A total of 1,219 responded to this particular survey question. See id.
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Of those who reported they do not participate in DFS, thirteen percent provided that their reason was due to not
knowing about DFS, while ten percent attributed their abstinence to concern over the legality of DFS. Id. at 13.
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Id. at 23.
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that eighty-five percent of those who perform extensive research of over five hours a week
previously noted, at least some correlation exists between performing research and making ROI.239
Of course, studying alone does not necessarily place one in the top percentile—one must possess
the skill required to succeed—but it indeed plays a substantial role in success.
Regardless of whether a contest is season-long or daily, when choosing lineups it is
important to consider a player’s entire body of work for that season. The ultimate goal is to insert
a player into one’s lineup during the athlete’s optimal performance during the season. To
accomplish this, a fantasy participant must study the player’s trends leading up to that day’s
particular real-life game. In traditional fantasy sports, fantasy owners are often handcuffed into
ignoring prior trends (i.e. less research is necessary) because of the extremely limited
alternatives—owners are typically limited to his/her “bench players.”240 Whereas in DFS, every
player in the league is available at the participant’s exposal.241
The time and research required to succeed in DFS certainly distinguishes it from sports
betting and gambling. There are many variables that go into successfully choosing which team
will likely win a sports contest. Sports gambling however is not dependent on studying these
variables because success is not contingent on dissecting each player’s attributes, but rather, the
broad totality of a team’s performance. Contrarily, without understanding certain variables, such
as player trends, matchups, weather, and injuries, a DFS participant will be far less successful. To
succeed in DFS, a participant must consider an individual athletes performance. Unlike point
spread wagers, an individual athlete’s performance often depends on several variables. For

239

Id.
Free agents are also available on waiver wires but are likewise a limited alternative. See discussion infra section
VI.b.
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This, of course, depends on which games are included in a particular contest. Nonetheless, any player who plays
the vacant position may be used to fill a participant’s roster spot. See DraftKings.com (last visited Jan. 15, 2016).
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instance, in fantasy football, a wide receiver must depend on whomever his quarterback is to
perform well enough to successfully throw the ball to the wide receiver.
Furthermore, the opposing defense plays a factor requiring consideration. For example, if
the opposing defense has a poor run defense, then the offense will throw the ball less making the
wide receiver less valuable. Of course, the opposing defensive line is a variable as well as the
opposing team’s defensive backs (this is the individual matchup factor that has a profound effect
on fantasy scoring). Finally, the intangibles, such as weather and home field advantage, are
relevant in fantasy scoring as well. If the game is played in rain or snow, it is far less likely that a
team will throw the ball and thus it might be more sensible to choose either the running back for
the team or avoid the contest altogether. The multitude of variables, and the amount of research
required to comprehend and apply them appropriately, eliminates chance as a predominant factor.
b. DFS ARE PREDOMINANTLY A GAME OF SKILL BECAUSE PLAYER ACTIONS HAVE A
SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON THE OUTCOMES OF CONTESTS
The court in Commonwealth v. Two Elec. Poker Game Machs. noted that there is a certain
level of skill associated with poker.242 However, because a poker player has no control over which
cards are dealt, chance played a predominant role.243 In DFS however, a participant has a
considerable amount of control in choosing which players to start. While the participant has no
control over how their chosen athlete performs, DFS is distinguishable from poker because a
participant can make a knowledgeable decision on who to start based on past performances. In
DFS, it is more than luck that determines how the course of the contest plays out.
Human action plays a significant role in determining a participant’s success in DFS
contests. If chance were a predominant factor in determining DFS outcomes, then computer
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See Two Elec., 502 Pa. at 195.
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generated lineups chosen at random would produce comparable results to human generated
lineups.244 However, in a study conducted by MIT Professor Anette (Peko) Hosoi, simulations
showed just the opposite.245 The simulation compared the fantasy points of actual FanDuel user
lineups with computer generated lineups that were subject to two conditions: (1) that at least
eighty-five percent of the salary cap be used and (2) and that the salary be apportioned according
to each position’s relative value (e.g., higher salary be apportioned to the higher valued running
back position than the kicker position).246 The results revealed that the human users outscored the
computer generated lineups eighty-six percent of the time for NFL contests and ninety-five percent
of the time for NBA contests.247
The issue with this simulation is that, if some computer generated lineups used only eightyfive percent of its salary cap, artificially inflated numbers are produced because those lineups are
at a statistical disadvantage considering players are priced according to their skill level. Two bits
of information would be helpful in buttressing Professor Hosoi’s simulation: (i) the average salary
cap percentage used across all DFS users and (ii) the average salary cap percentage exhausted by
the top twenty percent of players—who collect an average of 86.7 percent of gross winnings
throughout the different DFS contests offered.248
c. DFS ARE PREDOMINANTLY A GAME OF SKILL BECAUSE CHANCE VARIABLES ARE
NEARLY ELIMINATED IN THE DAILY FORMAT
Daily Fantasy is arguably more of a skill-based game than traditional fantasy sports
because injuries and seeding factors play a smaller role. While chance is not completely eliminated
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it is indeed diminished in the DFS format. For instance, injuries play a significant role in seasonlong fantasy sports. Injuries to players that are integral to one’s team is based heavily on an
element of chance. Some factors may raise or lower the chances of injury, such as the amount of
playing time or genetics; nonetheless, every athlete is vulnerable to an injury. Where skill becomes
relevant, as argued by opponents of DFS, is in the ability to drop, trade, and acquire free agent
players—a staple in season-long fantasy sports but absent in DFS. This notion is given too much
weight.
In traditional fantasy sports, which typically consist of twelve-team leagues, the players
available as “free agents” are either one of two types of players: (1) low-caliber players (i.e., player
who do not score high fantasy points because of their low skill or playing time) or (2) the reserve
or backup player to the original injured player. The second scenario is based purely on chance
because given the added player’s status as a backup player, he comes equipped with only a small
body of in-game performance to base one’s reasonable judgment on. Therefore one must rely on
luck as to whether that added free agent performs well.
Essentially, a season-long fantasy participant with the winningest team may suffer an injury
to their best player halfway through a season (or be victim to the nightmare scenario of an injury
immediately preceding playoffs) and thereafter struggle to salvage their team. On the contrary,
DFS, through daily contests, substantially diminishes the injury dilemma associated with fantasy
sports. When provided with accurate and timely sports news updates, a fantasy owner can adjust
appropriately before submitting a lineup, thereby eradicating the injury issue almost entirely.
An additional factor to consider is the real-life success of the sports team a fantasy player
belongs to. Often times, a coach may decide to rest a player when more important playoff games
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are approaching.249 This is done to secure the highest performance of the athlete in elimination
games rather than risk injury or fatigue by playing the athlete in what has become a meaningless
regular season game. Moreover, this strategy is employed typically at the end of a sport’s regular
season, which usually coincides with fantasy playoffs.250
It is almost impossible to predict at the beginning of a season which teams will be in the
position to rest prime players come season’s end. In this sense, season-long fantasy participants
are essentially gambling on which teams will finish the season with a playoff berth and avoiding
players from those teams. If a season-long fantasy participant by chance owns a player who is
rested in the final few weeks of a season, that individual is stuck without a quality replacement.
On the contrary, the DFS format eradicates this issue because a participant may choose different
players each contest. Therefore, chances of injury or rest become less relevant.
d. DFS ARE PREDOMINANTLY BASED ON SKILL BECAUSE OUTCOMES ARE
PREDICTABLE OVER SHORT PERIODS OF TIME AND SKILL LEVELS IMPROVE OVER
LONGER PERIODS OF TIME.
An additional consideration that supports the notion that DFS are predominately based on
skill relates to the acknowledgment that a participant’s skill-level is consistent over short periods
of time and can improve over longer periods of time.251 DFS even segregates its contests based
on skill level. DFS operators offer beginner contests exclusively to those new to the game who
have entered into less than fifty beginner contests.252 Beginners can choose to bypass these
contests entirely; but nonetheless, it is an opportunity for new participants to build the requisite
skill to participate in more competitive contests. These segregated contests suggest that beginners
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inherently have lower skill due to their lack of experience. Almost any skill, with practice and
experience, can be developed and grow.
While this argument may be diluted by the fact that DFS itself implements segregated
contests, any bias is a misconception. DFS providers have an interest in drawing in new players
to their game. Thus, DFS must maintain contests that are fair and competitive. Beginners that
join and have no success are more likely to quit. However, as logic will dictate, beginners that are
successful, or that at least remain competitive, will enjoy the game and continue playing. As their
skill-level increases, beginners become more adept to the game and are more capable of competing
in advanced contests.
Nonetheless, professor Hosoi has demonstrated in her study that skill levels remain
persistent as the amount of contests entries grow.253 Hence, certain players have a propensity to
win while others have a propensity to lose.254 Professor Hosoi accomplished this by measuring
win percentages for the first and second halves of a sports season and then assigning a skill
valuation.255 She then observed that as the amount of contests grew larger, skill factor played a
more prominent role, allowing predictable outcomes of participants.256
Professor Hosoi further observed that over longer periods of time, skill develops and
participants become more skilled.257 By grouping participants in four quartiles—one being the
least experienced and four being the most experienced (having submitted at least 3,042 entries)—
and tracking their performances, professor Hosoi observed that the most experienced participants
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were significantly more successful.258 Those with the most experience had a sixty-six percent win
fraction, opposed to quartile one, which had only a forty-three percent win fraction.259 From this,
Professor Hosoi was able to conclude that skill can develop with experience.260
VII.

SOLUTION

In October, 2015, a scandal erupted that had policy makers questioning the legitimacy of
the DFS industry.261 Reports surfaced regarding leaked insider-information that may have led to
DraftKings employee Ethan Haskell’s $350,000 payout on FanDuel.262 DFS immediately became
scrutinized as an unsafe pitfall for consumers.

Concerns over data control and consumer

protections became the forefront in the DFS debate.263

DFS operators responded with an

immediate change in policy that prohibits all DFS employees from participating in contests where
money is involved.264 Furthermore, the Fantasy Sports Trade Association established the Fantasy
Sports Control Agency—a self-governing body charged with overseeing “a strict, transparent and
effective system of self-regulation . . . .”265
Nonetheless, the game’s suspect qualities were exposed in mainstream media outlets,
certainly with a loss of participants imminent. Oddly enough, this was not what ensued. Rather,
data suggests that DFS reached record high entry fees the weekend following the scandal.266 While
DFS operators were flooded with criticism, the industry was enjoying the pinnacle of its success
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up to that point.267 Perhaps then, DFS represents something more to its faithful consumers than a
mere sports wager or even a touted skill; perhaps, an escape from reality.
a. THE UNLAWFUL INTERNET GAMING ENFORCEMENT ACT SHOULD BE AMENDED TO
CONSIDER DAILY FANTASY AND ADOPT A UNIFORM PREDOMINANCE STANDARD TO
DETERMINE IF A GAME IS SKILL OR CHANCE-BASED.
Currently, confusion shrouds the DFS industry as to its legality.

Because of this

uncertainty, regulation efforts are impeded. States, such as New York, have temporarily outlawed
DFS operation within their borders, pending government clarification. Hence, to solve the various
nationwide issues, the federal government should adopt New Jersey’s approach towards internet
gaming and apply it to DFS providers, much like California has done in its AB 1437 bill.
Without at least some type of interpretation at the federal level, states will continue to take
drastically different stances on each side of the DFS argument. Participants—DFS consumers—
are left uncertain and vulnerable to legal action and financial harm. A major concern that lies
with the consumer is the uncertainty associated with the exchange of money. Currently, DFS does
not operate in several states for legal purposes.268 Whether a consumer can retrieve his rightful
winnings when inside a prohibited state’s borders is not entirely clear. Thus, the law should
recognize DFS as distinct from gambling. This will provide participants with certainty in their
earned winnings. Congress should amend UIGEA to allow for interstate daily fantasy play and
regulate it as interstate commerce. The first step is to include language that simply incorporates
DFS into the current fantasy carve-out. The language used should be similar to the Whelan Bill
and AB 1437, such as:
“Fantasy Sports” means any contest determined by statistics
generated based on performance by actual individuals participating
267
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in actual professional or collegiate athletic events, regardless of the
frequency in which contests are renewed and offered to consumers.
This simple solution will eradicate the current uncertainty associated with the applicability of
UIGEA to DFS. By addressing the frequency of the rate at which a fantasy game can be played,
the definition eliminates the foregoing confusion over the legality of DFS. As a result, states and
DFS participants will no longer fear violating the law and losing entry fees as a consequence. A
federal endorsement can provide a safeguard for those participants in outlawed states. Federal law
can facilitate contests between states by establishing the legality of DFS and thus eradicate any
public concerns related to uncertainty. This definition simply clarifies the difference between
traditional and daily by acknowledging that contests can be conducted on a daily basis and that
daily lineups likewise operate as a game of skill.
Furthermore, a uniform Predominant Purpose standard must be adopted for courts to
determine whether a game is skill or chance-based. Currently, some jurisdictions employ minority
tests that allow an injection of subjectivity into a court’s reasoning. The Material Element and the
Gambling Instinct tests must be abandoned entirely. This transition will not be difficult given that
jurisdictions applying these minority tests have already, in some instances, confused them with the
Predominant Purpose Test.269 The amendment can simply add the predominance language in
clause (c) of the UIGEA fantasy carve-out, which would read:
(c) Winning outcomes are based predominantly on the relative skill
and knowledge of participants, with chance being attributable to an
outcome by less than fifty percent, determined by accumulated
statistics of multiple athletes.
This solves the subjectivity issue which currently dominates several jurisdictions. A uniform
standard will provide certainty for operators, DFS and other gaming providers alike. Gaming

269

See , supra note 96 and accompanying text.

Scott 48
operators will have a workable formula, using statistical analysis, in determining exactly what the
odds of a game is and whether that game is predominately determined by skill. Prediction in this
area of gambling law will clear the dockets of meritless cases, allow operators to provide lawful
games to consumers, and create harmony for intrastate providers, such as DFS operators.
b. THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR A DFS LICENSING
AND REGULATORY SCHEME.
Given the pervasive nature of DFS online, Congress should regulate the industry as
interstate commerce.

To facilitate a fluid regulatory scheme, Congress should assign the

responsibility of enforcing the industry to a federal agency, in an effort to keep DFS pure and to
prolong the enjoyment for sports fans. Limits should be imposed through a body of federal
regulations. Like the CCA Amendments discussed previously, DFS participants would benefit
tremendously from regulations. While regulations may indeed provide less financial incentive for
operators to manage DFS, it would ensure security and fairness to its users.
Because participants have the opportunity to win cash prizes, there is an addiction concern
that accompanies DFS. Much like individuals are drawn to the thrill of winning money at casinos,
addiction to DFS may pose an even larger concern considering lesser-skilled participants are
statistically at a disadvantage against higher-skilled participants. Thus, a solution is to limit the
amount of entry fees that one participant can forfeit in a single week. This would lower the
“gambling appeal” for those with addictive personalities. The notion here is create a less hostile
playing environment and more of a friendly, “side wagers” environment, as New York Attorney
General Schneiderman advocates.270 A $500 per week limit will lower the probability of those
becoming addicted to DFS.
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Furthermore, high-stake entry fees in fantasy should be reserved for those gambling
sanctuaries articulated in PASPA. The higher the stakes, the more DFS resembles gambling. DFS
users should be restricted to one entry per contest to eradicate the “probability” strategies employed
by the “bulk” participants.271 This will further differentiate DFS from gambling because it
eliminates the contemplation of raising one’s probabilities by having an abundance of entries. On
the contrary, implementing probability strategies reflects a certain knowledge that tends to add
another element of skill to the game. However, the means of increasing probability (i.e., buying
more entries to increase one’s odds) takes no skill because, as it relates to the game, spending
money in order to increase one’s odds does not gauge one’s performance. Eliminating or setting
a modest limit on the number of entries will focus participants on compiling a team based on
individual matchups—a more accurate reflection of one’s skill or knowledge of a sport. Moreover,
disclosure and availability of an entry fee history to participants should be required by law. This
will also help lower addiction issues. A system of “cool-off” periods should be included, on top
of the natural cool-off periods that accompany seasonal sports. This also will help curb the appeal
to DFS and lead to less abuse.
The federal government should delegate regulatory duties to a federal agency responsible
for overlooking DFS operation in each state. The most appropriate agency is the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), as it already oversees consumer protection.272 The primary benefit of having
federal oversight is to maintain uniformity. States can still freely govern and control intrastate
gambling, albeit in a uniform way with the FTC supervising operation. Like New Jersey’s
Division of Gaming enforcement, the FTC can establish an office with proper expertise in
regulatory gaming; for example, an Office of Fantasy Sports Regulation (“OFSR”). The OFSR
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can enforce the laws enacted to regulate the industry as an authoritative body and supervise state
licensing schemes. Furthermore, OFSR can effectively facilitate the enjoyment for consumers’
participation in DFS while placing a safeguard on the integrity of sports. This would undoubtedly
preserve a sense of fairness and would maintain the competitiveness of professional sports. The
OFSR can also be in charge of prosecuting satellite DFS operators in violation of regulations. For
example, following the Internet gaming regulations in New Jersey, the agency can employ
investigation teams to verify that equipment and operations are in compliance with regulations.
The OFSR should also supervise state-help programs and hotlines for those who become obsessive
over playing DFS by ensuring proper protocol. Regulations should require that DFS provide a
states help number hotline to all DFS users.
Finally, the federal government can require a separate taxation on the industry for operating
a quasi-gambling regime that is based on a game of skill. The federal government can tax DFS
Operators in a similar fashion as to the way New Jersey taxes its internet gaming and California
its DFS operators. While a 15% rate is high considering (1) the activity is not textbook gambling
and (2) DFS companies will already be taxed accordingly as their statuses as business entities,
perhaps a lower rate would be justified because of DFS’s similarities to gambling. However, just
as alcohol is taxed at a higher rate, higher taxation may be justified as a sin tax. The revenue
acquired from taxation should nonetheless be fixed at a rate necessary to financially support the
nationwide operation of DFS. Furthermore, due to its involvement in facilitating the industry, the
government will be justified in designating part the revenue raised to the national treasury to be
redistributed according to state needs.
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c. DE-GAMBELIZING DAILY FANTASY SPORTS: ELIMINATING “HIGH-STAKE”
“HIGHER-PROBABILITY” SCENARIOS.

AND

Substantive issues remain that need to be resolved to further distinguish DFS with illegal
gambling. What resembles gambling probably the most is the “high-stake” contests which allow
entry fees of over $1,000. Regulation must address this by placing a limit on the total amount of
entry fees allowed. This would almost certainly cut into profits tremendously—fantasy sharks
would be less willing to participate with a lower chance of winning meaningful profit. With less
total entries, DFS operators have a smaller prize pool to take their percentage from. Whether it
would be financially worth it to continue operation is a speculative question that has yet to be
answered.
Furthermore, DFS sites currently permit participants to play in bulk, submitting hundreds
of team entries in a single contest.273 Fantasy sharks enter a multitude of contests creating a
plethora of various lineups to maximize their odds and reap substantial profits.274 In order to make
contests fair for all and limit the contests to true skill, limits must be placed on the amount of
entries an individual participant may submit in a single contest.
a. THE THREAT TO THE INTEGRITY OF AMATEUR AND PROFESSIONAL SPORTS MUST BE
ADDRESSED THROUGH REGULATION.
Perhaps one of the largest issues is the threat DFS poses to the integrity of sports. This is
the primary reason regulation is necessary. While skill predominates DFS, the influence it could
potentially have on sports is far from fantasy; it is a real threat. For this reason alone, DFS should
be given an intermediate classification as a game of skill with inherent addictive tendencies.
Regulation should ensue to ensure veracity in sports and simultaneously abhor outlawing DFS.
DFS may affect the integrity of sports because, as it stands, virtually every team and league has

273
274

See Harwell, supra note 282.
Id.

Scott 52
some type of equity arrangement, sponsorship, of just a flat out stake in the company.275 The NBA
for instance, has an equity stake and a seat reserved on FanDuel’s board of directors.276 Typically,
most teams have arranged team-controlled media buys that are designated for either FanDuel or
DraftKings marketing purposes.277
“Fantasy Sports Lounges” are also being erected within the stadiums of professional sport
teams, allowing fans to engage in contests while at live sporting events.278 These lounges closely
resemble sportsbooks and, in some instances, have been referred to as such.279 While DFS does
not amount to gambling, it certainly is being exploited as if it were. Thus, the solution is to erect
a financial barrier between DFS and the professional sports leagues. In no way should any league
profit directly from endorsement deals or have a say in the direction of DFS businesses.
It is far more blatant and suspect for sports leagues to sponsor wagers on the results of real
sports contest. However for DFS, “throwing” or “fixing” professional sports games is more
difficult because there is a wider range of variables. But this is precisely the reason to eliminate
business relationships between the leagues and DFS. DFS providers collect data on the percentage
of participants who start individual players. If a contest gets big enough, and enough participants
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“start” a specific player, influence may be exerted on the player, effecting his/her natural
performance. Furthermore, reaching one individual player is easier than influencing an entire
professional sports roster. And so too is keeping the influence over one individual a secret. This
possibility must be eliminated altogether. Professional sport leagues must draw an ethical barrier
in the same way the leagues have abhorred sports betting. Congress should include in its act a
provision that prohibits this conduct.
b. SOLUTIONS TO SEVERAL OF ATTORNEY GENERAL SCHNEIDERMAN’S CONCERNS
States, such as New York, that intend to prohibit individuals from participating in DFS
contests are wrong to conclude that participants are engaged in illegal activity. This note offers a
response to several points in AG Schneiderman’s illegal gambling arguments.
First, AG Schneiderman presumes that DFS’s lottery-style advertisements support his
illegal gambling argument.280 He notes that advertisements promote the simplicity of the game
and the idea that anyone can participate and win.281 Because of this, he concludes that DFS
resembles gambling and should be declared illegal. However, advertising is distinct from the
contests. The content of DFS’s advertising has no bearing on whether it is a form of illegal
gambling. AG Schneiderman is correct in declaring that DFS advertisements are deceiving.
However, his position that the commercials lure the unskilled into a game of skill only concedes
the opposing argument. Most consumers who are deceived into playing DFS will likely join,
choose a team without knowledge of player trends, previous player performances, and player
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matchups, and consequently lose money to those “fantasy sharks” who are well-abreast to the ebb
and flow of fantasy statistics.282 Deceitful advertising is only an issue because DFS is based on
skill. One would not be deceived by the same commercial advertising a chance-based state lottery.
There is a simple solution to this: require DFS to be forthright about the requisite skill involved in
the game. Advertisements should depict the nature of the game by touting its competitiveness,
praising the most skilled players in the nation, and celebrating the individual efforts taken by
participants to improve their skill levels.
Second, the New York Attorney General looks to distinguish playing daily and traditional
fantasy sports based on camaraderie and the former’s lack of a social component. This however,
does not carry weight. Certainly, friends and family can engage socially in discussions over which
players would be better off being put into a daily fantasy starting lineup. Furthermore, there is a
sense of local competitiveness in the quest to identify “sleeper picks” based on matchups.283 When
a sleeper pick is correctly identified and entered into a line-up, this prompts that participant to
flaunt his superior knowledge of the game.
The biggest flaw with AG Schneiderman’s argument is that camaraderie and face-to-face
relationships are quickly becoming less relevant in the modern social arena.284 Facebook and
Instagram have established precedence in allowing individuals to socialize online without having
ever physically met prior to online interaction.285 DFS is simply another gateway to meet other
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individuals with similar interests and engage them socially through fantasy competition. It is a
step away from face-to-face encounters, but it is something that must be embraced in this
technological era dominated by virtual social interaction.
VIII.

Conclusion

In sum, while there are quasi-gambling aspects to DFS contests, in no way can DFS be
characterized as illegal gambling. DFS contests are games that are predominantly based on skill.
However, some of the dangers associated with such an addictive game calls for federal regulation.
The suggestions offered in this note provide a uniform, workable solution to those issues. A debate
that has now frequently come under the nation’s scrutiny, of course, has no simple solution. But
a regulatory scheme appears to be the most appropriate way for DFS to survive. Even for the
founders of DFS, regulation is beginning to emerge as the logical course of action. In response to
what has apparently become a frequently asked question of whether DraftKings supports DFS
regulation, Eccles answered: “[w]e are open to discussion.”286

twenty-two percent were comprised of people they knew from high school, twelve were extended family, ten were
coworkers, nine percent were college friends, eight percent was immediate family, seven percent were people from
extracurricular groups, and two were neighbors.” Seven percent, or roughly thirteen people, were complete
strangers. Three percent, or roughly seven people, had met only once before they became Facebook friends. Id.
286
DraftKings.com, Frequently Asked Questions, https://www.draftkings.com/help/faq (last accessed Apr. 16,
2016).

